

~~SECRET~~

25X1

25X1

The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

NIC No. 04985-85  
3 October 1985

National Intelligence Council

## MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: DCI Discussion with [ ]

25X1

1. [ ] Soviet leadership as:

25X1

- Paranoid
- Feeling besieged, internationally and most important economically.
- Wanting reassurances of good intent from the US and a better relationship with the US . . . in order that the Soviet Union may proceed with greater impunity and less economic cost to itself with its expansionist policies.

That description coincides with that generally given by the Intelligence Community in the last few years.

2. What is most interesting are [ ] what US policy toward the Soviet Union should be:

25X1

- On the one hand he wants the US vigorously to oppose and defeat Soviet actions outside its borders.
- On the other hand he wants the US to allay Soviet fears of aggressive actions by the West and to come to arms control agreements, which would make possible a diversion of resources to civilian needs (. . . to help the starving Russian people. . .).

3. As impractical [ ] prescription may be, I believe it is in line with the thinking of many in the Soviet Union --inside and outside the governing structure--who have come to hate the Soviet system but are also concerned about the security and well-being of [ ] public posture which:

25X1

25X1

- Castigates the Soviet Union for its meddling throughout the world

CL BY SIGNER  
DECL OADR  
DERV MULTIPLE

25X1

25X1

~~SECRET~~

SECRET/

25X1

25X1

- Explains Western military policies as being intended solely to defeat that meddling
- But also holds forth the possibility of a better relationship--including mutually advantageous economic interactions--and real arms control if the Soviet Union stops the actual use or threat of military power to get its way around the world.

4. I am under no illusion that such a policy would bring about the conversion of Gorbachev and his Politburo colleagues, but it would:

- Make it increasingly harder for Gorbachev and company to make--both inside and outside the Soviet Union--a rationale case for their own approach to international relations.
- Meet with the general approbation of our Allies and reinforce Allied cohesion.
- And, probably most important, appeal [redacted] in the Soviet system who [redacted] actively to cooperate with us and thus help us wage the continuing and necessary struggle against Soviet imperialism.

25X1

25X1

4. A final observation. When arms control becomes the central element in our relationship with the Soviet Union we are at a disadvantage. We are accepting Moscow's agenda which allows the Soviets to play on the patriotic feelings of their people, to wage peace campaigns among our Allies, and to paint us as obsessed with military superiority. Our strength lies in ideas--particularly the ideal of freedom and self-determination. We should always keep the focus on that and constantly remind the world and the Soviets that only Moscow's acceptance of those ideals would make real arms control possible.



George Kolt

Distribution:

1 - NIO/USSR

1 - NIO/EUR

NIO/EUR/GKOLT/sb1, [redacted] 40CT85

25X1

SECRET/

25X1

25X1